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Abstract
The paper studies the design of inter-governmental transfers when re-
distribution is e¤ected through the public provision of a private good
(education) by local government agents. The central government does
not necessarily have the same preferences as the local agents regarding
the relative welfare of poor and non-poor individuals, but must rely on
them to implement public spending decisions. This divergence of pref-
erences induces an incentive role, which does not rely on the existence
of externalities, for matching grants that take the form of two-part tar-
i¤s. Numerical simulations are used to investigate the dependence of the
matching grant on the relationship between central and local preferences,
local poverty rates, and the use of poverty maps.
1 Introduction
Income redistribution has long been seen as the role of central rather than local
governments, both due to the likely desirability of inter-regional transfers, and
the potential for individuals to vote with their feet, that yields equilibrium un-
coordinated within-region redistribution ine¤ective. In countries with sophis-
ticated individual income tax systems, this allocation of responsibility seems
appropriate. But in countries with less developed tax systems, and even in
more advanced economies, redistribution often takes place via the public provi-
sion or …nancing of private goods.1 Important examples of these are education
and health services, but also include locally administered welfare programs (e.g.,
Galasso and Ravallion, 2000). Lately however, there has been a move towards
¤wgj@georgetown.edu. Thanks to Je¤ Hammer for close collaboration and generous sup-
port.
1Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Blomquist and Christiansen (1999), Lommerud (1989), and
Besley and Coate (1991) o¤er illustrations.
1decentralized provision of these services in many countries. This paper thus
examines the optimal design of intergovernmental transfers when expenditure
policies with distributional e¤ects are delegated to self-interested agents at the
local level.
When regions or localities (we shall use the terms interchangeably) di¤er in
their incomes, there is a clear role of centrally implemented transfers between
them. While the model we develop will admit analysis of such situations, our
primary focus is on the role of central-local transfers as mechanisms for pro-
viding incentives to self-interested local bureaucrats or politicians. Thus we
abstract, at least initially, from issues of inter-regional (sometimes called tax
equalizing) transfers. For central-local budgetary policy to play a substantive
role in generating incentives, two conditions must be satis…ed: …rst, the imple-
menting agent must have di¤erent preferences to the central decision maker (the
principal), and second, the actions or preferences of the agent must be private
information. We focus in this paper on the case of adverse selection, in which
the preferences of local agents are not known by the central authority.
All localities are populated by both poor and non-poor individuals. Each
local agent allocates a …xed budget over two types of goods: a pure public good,
and a private good, which we shall refer to as education. For simplicity there
is no role for the private sector in the provision of either type of good. Impor-
tantly, the local agent can costlessly allocate di¤erent quantities of education
to members of the two groups, but does not redistribute income between them
directly. Allocations are made to maximize a weighted average of individual
utilities.
The central government also cares about a weighted average of individual
utilities, but this weight may di¤er from those used by the agents. Nonetheless,
the center is constrained to use the local agents to make education allocation de-
cisions. If all parties have the same preferences, and this is common knowledge,
then the center’s preferred allocation is easily attainable. We shall identify this
as the …rst best. The second best outcome occurs when the preferences of the
center and the localities can di¤er, but when the center can make (on average
revenue neutral) lump-sum transfers, conditional on those local preferences. The
third best, which is the primary focus of this paper, prevails when the center’s
preferences di¤er from those of the heterogeneous agents, but when the agents’
preferences are private information. In this case, conditional lump-sum grants
are infeasible, and other transfer mechanisms are needed.
In this paper, the particular …nancial transfer we shall examine is a uni-
form lump-sum transfer to all localities, plus a proportional share of the total
education expenditures of each. Thus the center cannot subsidize or tax edu-
cation spending for the poor or the non-poor separately within a locality. This
assumption is motivated by recognizing the relative ease with which education
expenditures on alternative groups can be relabelled.2 This model allows us
to rationalize the use of matching grants, even when there are no externalities
associated with the activity upon which the grant is based. Thus it diverges
2This …nancing mechanism is isomorphic to the linear income tax (Sheshinski, 1972).
2qualitatively from the …scal federalism framework recently surveyed by Oates
(1999).3
Our model is related to the literature on decentralized redistribution (Con-
ning and Kevane, 1999, Ravallion, 1999, 1999, Galasso and Ravallion, 2000).
The paper does not present a full model of the political process, in the sense that
local authorities’ preferences are not endogenized (as, for example, in Bardhan
and Mookherjee, 1998, 1999, and 2000). However, it contributes to the litera-
ture on incentives and organizational design by formally modelling the e¤ects
of alternative central-local interactions within a normative model.
The next section presents the formal model in the tradition of the linear
income tax model. Section 3 examines the second best policy, when the central
government can observe the preferences of local agents, but still relies on them
to implement policy choices. Section 4 presents a formal solution to the third
best problem. As is typical of these kinds of models, the solution is implicit,
so numerical simulations are performed to illustrate the nature of the optimal
intergovernmental grants. In section 5 we allow regional poverty rates to vary,
and perform a number of comparative statics exercises. This analysis permits
an evaluation of so-called poverty targeting mechanisms, whereby localities with
di¤erent poverty rates are treated di¤erently. In additional, we investigate the
e¤ects of correlation between local poverty rates and local agents’ preferences on
optimal matching grants. Section 6 concludes by suggesting related applications
of the model in the contexts of addressing the male-child bias and the allocation
of international aid.
2 The model
There is a central government and a continuum of local authorities of mass
one. Citizens of each jurisdiction consume three goods, education (s), a public
good (g), and other consumption (c). Prices of consumption and education are
normalized to one for everyone. Utility is a quasi-concave function u(c;s;g) of
these goods.
Citizens are either poor or non-poor. Poor people, who make up a share
® of the local population, have …xed consumption cp, and the non-poor have
consumption cn > cp. The local government allocates education and the public
good to individuals directly. It can tell who is who, and chooses sp and sn, and
the single level g in accordance with its preferences and budget.
So as not to bias things in favor of larger jurisdictions, I will assume that
all jurisdictions have the same number of individuals. Alternatively, we could
interpret g not as a public good, but as a private good consumed at a uniform
level by all individuals in the jurisdiction. Later, ® will be permitted to vary
across localities.
3Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (1996) employ similar techniques to those used here,
but within the context of a more traditional tax-equalization model.
32.1 Agents’ preferences
Local government preferences are a weighted average of the utilities of the poor
and non-poor. The weight ascribed to the well-being of the poor in the local
authority’s preference function is ¯, which is distributed across local authorities
according to the distribution function F on domain [0;1]. Thus, sp, sn, and g,
are chosen by the local authority to maximize
W(sp;sn;g) = ¯®u(cp;sp;g) + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ®)u(cn;sn;g): (1)
A local authority’s resources consist of own revenues R per capita, which we take
as exogenous, and central government transfers. The latter come in the form
of a grant that is a linear function of average per capita education spending,
s = ®sp + (1 ¡ ®)sn. That is, central transfers per capita are
T = a + bs
so the local authority’s per capita budget constraint is
g + (1 ¡ b)s = a + R: (2)
If the transfer is lump-sum, then b = 0. The local authority’s problem is then










g + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ®)un
g = ¸
where uq
x = @u(cq;sq;g)=@x, q = p or n. Optimal choices are denoted sp¤(a +
R;(1 ¡ b);¯), sn¤(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯), and g¤(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯), respectively.
The local authority’s “indirect welfare function” is then
f W(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯) = ¯®vp(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯) + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ®)vn(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯)
where
vq(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯) = u(cq;sq¤(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯);g¤(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯)):
vq(:) is like the ordinary indirect utility function of a q person, except that
his/her consumption of s and g are decided by the local authority. A version of







4where m is the local authority’s per capita lump-sum revenue, equal to a + R.




























¯®¹p + (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ®)¹n = ¸ (5)
and indeed, since the local authority optimizes,











Note well that ¸ depends on ¯, and on m = a + R.
2.2 The center’s preferences
Like the local agents, the central government’s preferences are de…ned over the
well-being of the citizens of each locality. The only potential di¤erence is that
the weight the center places on the utility of the poor, b ¯, may not coincide
with that used by a local agent. The central government’s valuation of citizens’
utilities is
V (sp;sn;g) = b ¯®up + (1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)un:
For given transfer parameters (which might vary with ¯, if this is observable),
local agent behavior determines a net transfers T(¯) to an authority with pref-
erence parameter ¯. We assume that the central government has a total budget





V (sp(¯);sn(¯);g(¯))dF subject to
Z
¯
T(¯)dF(¯) = T: (8)
53 The second-best
In the …rst-best, the central government directly redistributes income from the
non-poor to the poor. This case is of limited interest to us here. The second-
best occurs when the local authorities’ preferences are observable by the central
government, in which case inter-governmental transfers can be conditioned on
those preferences directly. Assuming then that b = 0 and using (6) and (7), a
marginal increase in per capita lump-sum income, m, of a jurisdiction ruled by
o¢cials with preference parameter ¯, yields an increase in central government
welfare of











This expression says that the marginal welfare associated with an increase in
a local authority’s per capita grant, as measured by the central government,
is a multiple »(¯) of the marginal welfare as measured by the local authority
itself. The center’s marginal welfare is larger than the local authority’s if and
only if its pro-poor preference is su¢ciently di¤erent to the local authority’s. In
particular after a little manipulation, »(¯) > 1 if and only if
®(b ¯ ¡ ¯) > ¯(b ¯ ¡ ¯):
There are two cases to consider: b ¯ > ®, and b ¯ < ®. In the …rst case, as long as ¯
is smaller than ® or larger than b ¯, »(¯) > 1. Similarly, in the second case, as long
as ¯ is smaller than b ¯ or larger than ®, »(¯) > 1. Thus in both circumstances,
the center’s marginal welfare gain is larger than the local authority’s as long as
¯ is either low or high. Only when ¯ is between ® and b ¯ is the local authority’s
marginal welfare gain higher than the center’s.
To illustrate these relationships further, consider the case b ¯ > ®. As long as
¯ > b ¯ the center’s marginal welfare is larger than the local authority’s - this can
be interpreted as arising because there are not enough poor people (® is low)
to satisfy the relatively strong pro-poor preferences of the local authority. Simi-
larly, if ¯ is too low (less than ®), even the small number of poor, whose utilities
receive a low weight by the local government, contribute little to local welfare,
and relatively more to the center’s measure. Only when ¯ is intermediary, be-
tween ® and b ¯, does the center value additional per capita income less than the
local authority. The same kind of story can be told for the second case, b ¯ < ®.
Note that when b ¯ = ®, it can be simply shown that »(¯) achieves a minimum
value of 1 over the entire range [0;1]. Thus, except when the local government’s
preferences are identical to those of the center (¯ = ®), the marginal welfare of
income as evaluated by the center is larger than that as measured by the local
government. In general however, the center’s evaluation of the marginal welfare
of additional per capita income can be lower than that of the local authority.
6Di¤erentiation of »(¯) con…rms that the function attains a unique minimum





(1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)
b ¯®
:
If »(e ¯) < 1, then for localities with ¯ in a neighborhood of e ¯ the marginal
utility of income as assessed by the local authority is greater than as assessed
by the central government. This does not, of course, imply that the central
government’s optimal schedule of lump-sum grants will redistribute away from
localities with ¯ near e ¯. This depends on the behavior of the actual marginal
utility of income as ¯ varies. A weaker proposition is that, starting from a
position in which per capita grant income is distributed across jurisdictions
so as to equalize local marginal welfares, the central government will wish to
redistribute income from jurisdictions with “intermediary” preferences to those





¸(¯;m0(¯)) = ¸ for all ¯
for some constant ¸. Starting from this distribution of income, there exist
values ¯
¡ < e ¯ < ¯
+ such that the central government would wish to tax
jurisdictions for which ¯ 2 (¯
¡;¯
+), and to use the proceeds to subsidize those
with preference parameters outside this range.
More generally, the central government’s second-best problem is to specify
the distribution of per capita income, m¤(¯) = a¤(¯) + R, that is feasible and





º(¯;m¤(¯)) = º for all ¯
We do not solve this control problem here, mainly because our primary interest is
in the third-best. However, it is instructive to report some descriptive results of
numerical simulations. The speci…cations of these simulations will be discussed
later, in section 5. Figure 1 shows the behavior of the local and central marginal
welfares of income as functions of ¯ when all local authorities have the same
lump-sum grant (i.e., before any centrally mandated redistribution).
The marginal welfare of income as measured by local preferences, ¸, increases
with ¯. However, as measured by central preferences (in this case, b ¯ = 0:5),
the marginal welfare of local income, º, is U-shaped, slightly skewed to the
4The right hand side is always positive, and the left hand side ranges from 0 to 1, so a







































































































Local marginal welfare of income
Central marginal welfare of income
Relative central marginal welfare
Figure 1: Local and central marginal welfare of local budget income
right relative to »(¯) due to the fact that ¸ is increasing. The optimal schedule
of lump-sum grants would in general be such as to equalize º(¯) across ¯,
and would be characterized by redistribution from the central range to both
extremes.
4 The third best
When the central government cannot distinguish between jurisdictions on the
basis of ¯, it is constrained to pay the same head grant, a, and to match educa-
tion spending at the same rate, b, for all local authorities (random allocations are
not considered). These parameters determine the allocation of utilities, given
the local authority’s preferences, ¯, which can be written
e V (a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯) = b ¯®vp(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯) + (1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)vn(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯)





e V (a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯)dF s.t. a + bE¯ [s] = T (9)
where s = s(a + R;(1 ¡ b);¯).
8It is worth writing the constraint in (9) as a = T ¡ bs, where s ´ E¯ [s],
to indicate that a is an implicit function of b, a(b), with derivative a0(b) =
¡s ¡ b(ds=db) (which should be negative, but it is hard to say in general).






































s ¡ s ¡ b(ds=db)
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¹p + (1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)
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cov(s;¹p) ¡ b(ds=db)E¯ [¹p]
¢
+ (1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)
¡




b ¯®cov(s;¹p) + (1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)cov(s;¹n) = b(ds=db)
³
b ¯®E¯ [¹p] + (1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)E¯ [¹n]
´
:
Using (6) and (7) and writing ¹q = E¯[¹q] as the average marginal utility of






b ¯cov(s;®¹p) + (1 ¡ b ¯)cov(s;(1 ¡ ®)¹n)
i
b ¯®¹p + (1 ¡ b ¯)(1 ¡ ®)¹n :
The denominator of this expression is the social marginal value of income, as
measured by the central authority (with weight b ¯) aggregated across individ-
uals, under the constraint that resources are allocated according to the local
authority’s preferences. This is positive. Each term in the numerator measures
the covariance in average education spending across values of ¯ with the total
marginal utility of income of each group (weighted by the number of people in
the group). The term out the front is likely to be positive, but due to the high
degree of implicitness this is not obvious.
5 Numerical simulations
To examine the determinants of optimal inter-governmental grants, we resort
to numerical simulations of the central government’s optimization problem. Let
us suppose that individuals have separable utility functions given by
uq(c;s;g) = !(c)vq(s;g)
where vq(s;g) is the sub-utility derived from education and the public good by
a q-person, with q = p or n. We assume the subutility of other consumption





(´qs½ + (1 ¡ ´q)g½)(1¡°)=½
where ° is the coe¢cient of risk aversion. The marginal rate of substitution
between education and the public good for a q person is
dg
ds










We assume that ´p > ´n, so for ½ < 1 a poor person’s demand would be
relatively skewed towards education ahead of the public good, compared to that
of a non-poor person.5 This feature of demand makes education an attractive
basis for redistribution.
5.1 Optimal inter-governmental transfers
Our …rst set of simulations describes the relationship between the parameters of
the optimal transfer mechanism and the relative preferences of the central and
local governments. We assume that the local authorities’ preference parameters
are distributed uniformly on [0;1], that is F(¯) = ¯, and examine how the
optimal transfer parameters change with b ¯. All localities have the same income
distributions, with half of their residents in poverty, ® = 0:5. The central
transfers must be self-…nancing, i.e., T = 0: The results are presented in Figure
2, for speci…c paramterizations of the utility functions as indicated.
Note that even for what might be regarded as a “neutral” central government
with b ¯ = 0:5, it is optimal to provide a subsidy at the margin to education
spending, b¤ > 0.6 Only when the central government becomes relatively anti-
poor, i.e., b ¯ ¼ 0:25, is it optimal to have no subsidy at the margin (and hence no
lump-sum …nancing tax). In the cases where central preferences are signi…cantly
anti-poor compared with the distribution of local preferences (b ¯ < 0:25), it is
optimal for the center to tax education spending at the margin. Conversely, as
the preferences of the central government for the poor come to dominate most
of those of the local authorities, i.e., as b ¯ ! 1, the optimal marginal education
subsidy increases, but with these parameters at least, does not rise above 40
percent.
Figure 3 illustrates the dependence of the optimal transfer parameters on lo-
cal poverty rates (assumed uniform across localities). The center’s preferences
5A more elaborate speci…cation would make the marginal rate of substitution between
education and the public good an explicit function of an individual’s other income. Since
there are only two types of individual in our model, this binary speci…cation is su¢cient.
6Note that because individuals have declining marginal utilities of income, neutrality (i.e.,
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Figure 2: Optimal transfer parameters as b ¯ varies. [° = 2, ´n = 0:3, ´p = 0:8,
½ = 0:5, ® = 0:5]
are assumed to be neutral (b ¯ = 0:5), and the localities to be distributed uni-
formly over [0;1]. An increase in the poverty rate from 45 percent to 55 percent
reduces the matching component of the intergovernmental grant from about 25
percent to less than 15 percent, with an o¤setting reduction in the lump-sum
tax.
5.2 Poverty targeting
There is a growing trend towards the use of so-called poverty maps to help cen-
tral governments better target redistributive transfers. The simple idea is that if
information about the geographic distribution of poverty can be obtained, then
central transfers can be used with greater e¢cacy. In this sub-section we inves-
tigate optimal transfer parameters when poverty rates di¤er across localities,
and when the central government can observe these di¤erences.
We assume there are just two di¤erent types of locality, ones with a high
poverty rate (®H) and ones with a low poverty rate (®L). The center’s problem
is to make separate lump-sum transfers and matching grants to the two di¤erent
types of locality, while maintaining overall budget balance. We can think of this
as a two stage process, wherein the center chooses a lump-sum per capita transfer
from non-poor to poor localities, and then solves the optimization problem
(9) for each type of locality separately. The overall optimum is determined
by varying the inter-regional transfer so as to maximize aggregate welfare, as
11-0.8
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Figure 3: E¤ects of poverty rates on optimal transfers
measured by the center.
We maintain the assumption that all localities have the same local budget
resources, so there continues to be no explicit need for …scal equalization across
regions.7 Figure 4 illustrates the case in which the distribution of local prefer-
ences is uniform over [0;1] for both high and low poverty rate localities. Thus
there is no correlation between localities’ poverty rates and the redistributive
preferences of the agents. Aggregate social welfare attains a maximum when
approximately 3 percent of the (common) local budget is redistributed from
localities with low poverty rates to those with high poverty rates. At the opti-
mum, the optimal matching rate for low poverty localities is b¤
L = 26 percent,
and that for high poverty rate regions is b¤
H = 14 percent.8
Although we have not modeled the formation of agents’ preferences in a
political economic framework, it might be expected that poverty rates and pro-
poor tendencies of local o¢cials should be correlated. A natural assumption
to make is that otherwise similar localities with higher poverty rates would be
controlled by agents with less interest in the well-being of the poor. On the
other hand, one could argue (as Galasso and Ravallion (1999) do) that as the
share of the poor in a local population rises, they become more powerful, and
7The regions tax bases are the same, but the number of poor people can di¤er. Since
the incomes of the poor and non-poor are the same in the di¤erent types of regions, this
assumption of equal tax bases can be questioned. It has no substantive impact on the
comparative statics to come however, and is useful in sterilizing the e¤ect of …scal inequality
on the nature of inter-governmental grants.
8These matching rates are not shown in the …gure.
120% 5% 10%
Redistribution from low to high poverty rate regions
Figure 4: E¤ect of redistribution on welfare when there is no correlation between
poverty rates and preferences
hence can increase the total (although not necessarily per capita) allocation of
public funds to their advantage.
One approach to examining the e¤ects of correlation is to specify a one-
parameter group of joint distribution functions of the form F(®;¯ : ½), where
½ is the correlation coe¢cient, and to allow ½ to vary. However, as there is
little to guide the choice of functional form, it is su¢cient at this stage to
illustrate the e¤ects with some simple speci…cations. Thus Figure ?? shows
the dependence of (normalized) social welfare on the size of the inter-regional
redistributive transfer for three cases: zero, low, and high correlation between
regions’ poverty rates and the preferences of the local agents. The bottom curve
(zero correlation) is just that of …gure 4 reproduced. The curve representing
the case of low correlation (middle curve) corresponds to a situation in which
the preference parameters of agents in low poverty rate localities are distributed
uniformly over the interval [0:1;1], while those of high poverty rate areas are
distributed uniformly over [0;0:9]. Thus agents in low poverty rate areas have,
on average, greater preference for the poor than those in high poverty rate areas.
The case of high correlation is also shown (top curve). In this case preference
parameters are distributed uniformly over [0;0:5] in high poverty areas, and over
[0:5;1] in low poverty areas.
In this example the higher is the (negative) correlation between a region’s
poverty rate and the preferences of the agent, the higher the inter-regional
redistributive transfer from low poverty regions to high poverty regions. This
is at …rst puzzling, since the redistribution appears to favor agents who are less
pro-poor than others.
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Figure 5: Optimal regional redistribution with di¤erent correlations between
poverty rates and preferences
At least two features of these comparative statics results are important in
understanding this result. First, since the distributions of agents’ preferences
are symmetrically displaced from the center’s preference parameter, we need
to be careful in identifying low poverty rate regions as having preferences that
are closer to those of the center. Second, agents’ preferences, while correlated
with poverty rates are, in this model, exogenous, so invoking the language of
incentives and rewards with respect to the e¤ects of inter-regional transfers is
misplaced.
Both of these features are of comparatively little importance however when
we consider not just the size and direction of the inter-regional transfer, but
the response of the optimal transfer parameters to the changes in correlation
between poverty rates and preferences. Figure 6 shows, schematically, the rela-
tionship between the matching grant rates for the low and high poverty regions
(b¤
L and b¤
H) as the degree of correlation changes from zero, to low, to high.
As the correlation between poverty rates and preferences grows, regions with
high poverty rates are ruled by o¢cials who place lower weight on the well-being
of the poor. Other things equal, this kind of misalignment of preferences between
the center and the localities calls for a higher rate of matching grant (see Figure
2). In order to …nance this higher matching rate, the lump-sum tax levied on
these localities would be increased, the e¤ects of which are partially o¤set with
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bL* bH*
Figure 6: Optimal sharing rates as a function of the correlation between poverty
and preferences
6 Other applications and conclusions
This paper has examined the way …nancial relationships between a central gov-
ernment and local authorities should be designed when local agents’ distribu-
tional objectives di¤er from those of the center. Using the particular example
of education spending, we were able to investigate the extent to which local
education expenditures should be matched by central transfers, and how these
parameters might vary with local poverty rates.
The model has wide applicability to other environments in which the distri-
bution of well-being amongst individuals is of concern, and when local agents
have control over the distribution of particular resources. Here we conclude by
examining a number of cases where the same kinds of issues might arise.
6.1 School attendance and the male child bias
A number of studies (e.g., Elson, 1991, Garg and Morduch, 1998, and Sudha
and Rajan, 1999) have documented the apparent favoritism a¤orded boys in
many contexts. In particular, poor families are sometimes inclined to keep girls
at home to help with household chores and income generation, while sending
boys to school. One form of public intervention to address this bias is to require
all children to attend school, but the chances of implementing such a policy
(especially adjusting for quality of education) are low. What kind of …nancial
transfer should a government design to assist in o¤setting the apparent male
child preference of parents?
15Within the context of our model, a pair of parents is seen as the implement-
ing agent. It allocates a private good (schooling) across members of the family,
using an implicit weight ¯ on the well-being of girls. The …nancial transfer to
the family takes the form of a per capita grant, plus a subsidy to the amount the
family spends on education (on both boys and girls). Depending of the wealth
of the family (corresponding to the local budget above), the number of girls
(corresponding to the poverty rate above), and preferences, an optimal mix be-
tween these two components of the transfer can be determined. A high marginal
subsidy rate would argue for basically free education for all, while a low subsidy
would suggest that direct …nancial transfers to families, independent of educa-
tional choices, are preferred as a means of addressing gender bias. Obviously
there are other aspects of intra-household allocation (e.g., access of boys and
girls to health care, including immunization, etc.) that would be susceptible to
similar analysis.
6.2 Allocating international aid
International donors and …nancial institutions often make it clear that they have
speci…c preferences over the intended distributional e¤ects of their policies. On
the other hand, national sovereignty means that these outside interventions
must usually be implemented by the national government, or at least with its
acquiescence, and methods for generating incentives for “appropriate” behavior
at the country level have received increasing attention recently (e.g., Collier,
1999).
The model of this paper can be used to understand the degree to which donor
policies should be conditional on endogenous choices of national governments.
Roughly speaking, little conditionality translates into little or no marginal sub-
sidy (or tax), with the assistance taking the form of a more or less lump-sum
grant. Higher conditionality would make the size of the …nancial transfer a
function of performance, akin to designing a transfer with a signi…cant match-
ing grant component. This might sometimes take the form of a cost-sharing
agreement.
A speci…c example of this is the recently formed Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunizations (GAVI), a well-funded coalition of international agencies,
bilateral donors, and pharmaceutical associations, that has been tasked with
increasing vaccination rates of children in the developing world.9 The large
but nonetheless …xed budget of this body is to be allocated to countries as
implementing agents. The model of this paper can be used to shed light on
the extent to which di¤erent countries (ones with larger “local budgets”, or
di¤erent “local poverty rates”, in the language of our model) might be required
to contribute their own funds to the purchase of vaccines. Indeed, the general
rules, while still under development, consist of a lump-sum payment to certain
countries, plus a certain matching grant/cost sharing component. Clearly there
is a high degree of heterogeneity across countries in relevant dimensions not
9For information on the alliance, see the web site www.vaccinealliance.org.
16considered here, but an underlying, if implicit, rationale for the cost-sharing
component is one of incentives.
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